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INTRODUCTION
As the United States Supreme Court observed in Marine
Bank v. Weaver, “Congress, in enacting the securities laws,
did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all
fraud.” 1 Accordingly, when it drafted section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 2 (Exchange Act), a broad,
* Associate Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law. This Article
was presented as part of a New Scholars Panel at the Southeastern Association
of Law Schools 2012 Annual Conference. I offer my thanks to Leslie Cooney,
who served as my mentor for the presentation, and to the participants at the
conference for their helpful comments. I also wish to thank Ryan Morrison for
his research assistance. All errors and omissions, of course, are my own.
1. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006).
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“catch-all” antifraud provision, 3 Congress provided that the
statute applies only to a fraud that is “in connection with” a
The Securities and Exchange
securities transaction. 4
Commission (SEC) appropriately imposed the same limitation
in Rule 10b-5, 5 the SEC’s “powerful antifraud weapon” 6 under
section 10(b).
The “in connection with” requirement—sometimes
referred to as the “transactional nexus” requirement 7—is
simple in concept, but difficult in application. Courts long
have struggled to interpret its breadth. The Supreme Court
has considered the issue in only three cases, all three of which
dealt with the same type of fraud—that involving the
misappropriation of assets. 8 In those cases, the Court
employed a test that, according to Justice Thomas, reflects
“an inconsistent and incoherent interpretation of the relevant
statutory language and . . . does not provide any predictable
guidance as to what behavior contravenes the statute.”9
Indeed, the Court’s test is hard to apply even to
misappropriation cases, and it is difficult to distill from it a
fundamental principle appropriate to analyze the “in
connection with” requirement more generally.
The Supreme Court in its few “in connection with” cases
has stated that, to meet the requirement, a fraud must
“touch” or “coincide” with a securities transaction. 10 These
words, unfortunately, do little more than restate the
3. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (emphasis added).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
6. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.3[2], at
442 (6th ed. 2009).
7. See, e.g., Ind. Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund v. Millard, No. 07 Civ.
172 (JGK), 2007 WL 2141697, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007) (“[F]raud is ‘in
connection with’ a purchase or sale when there is a ‘transactional nexus’
between the fraud and the transaction.”).
8. See generally S.E.C. v. Zandford 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002) (addressing a
misappropriation of cash); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 656 (1997)
(considering the “misappropriation theory” of insider trading); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 8 (1971) (addressing a
misappropriation of cash).
9. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 692 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
10. See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822 (“It is enough that the scheme to defraud
and the sale of securities coincide.”); O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“The securities
transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide.”); Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at
12–13 (“The crux of the present case is that Manhattan suffered an injury as a
result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor.”).
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requirement under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that a fraud
be “in connection with” a securities transaction. 11 They say
nothing of the degree of connection that is required. 12 The
Court’s emphasis that section 10(b) should be interpreted
“flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes” only adds to the
uncertainty. 13
Attempting to provide some structure to the
transactional nexus requirement under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in 2009 devised a multifactor test that draws on cases
from the Supreme Court and the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Third and Tenth Circuits. 14 In SEC v. Pirate
Investor LLC, the Fourth Circuit identified four relevant
factors to be considered:
(1) whether a securities sale was necessary to the
completion of the fraudulent scheme;
(2) whether the parties’ relationship was such that it
would necessarily involve trading in securities;
(3) whether the defendant intended to induce a securities
transaction; and
(4)
whether
material
misrepresentations
were
disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a
reasonable investor would rely. 15

The court indicated that the factors “exist merely to guide the
inquiry,” and stressed that they “are not mandatory
11. See C. Edward Fletcher, III, The “In Connection With” Requirement of
Rule 10b-5, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 913, 962 (1989) (emphasizing that the concept of
“touching” was a product of Justice’s Douglas’s literary style and that he merely
was stating in a different way that the fraud must be “in connection with” a
securities transaction); see also S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 244
(4th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o say that fraud is ‘in connection with’ a securities
transaction whenever it ‘coincides’ with that transaction hardly clarifies the
matter.”); Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 942 (2d Cir.
1984) (“We are inclined to agree . . . that ‘there is no reason to believe that
[Justice Douglas’s] use of ‘touching’ [in Bankers Life] was anything more than
his variation of ‘in connection with’ as a matter of literary style.’ ”).
12. Fletcher, supra note 11, at 962 (noting that “there is nothing in the
notion of ‘touching’ that implies necessarily either a loose or a tight nexus
requirement.”).
13. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)); see Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12 (“Section
10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.”).
14. Pirate Investor, 580 F.3d at 244.
15. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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requirements” and are not necessarily the only relevant
factors. 16 Yet, the court provided no general principle for
determining when a particular factor should apply, how to
weigh the factors, or how to know when to consider other
factors. Consequently, the test runs the risk of being—to
quote Judge Posner—“like many other multi-factor tests,
‘redundant, incomplete, and unclear.’ ” 17
This Article proposes to save Pirate Investor’s multifactor
test from redundancy, incompleteness, and lack of clarity by
introducing a general principle for the “in connection with”
requirement and suggesting modifications to the Fourth
Circuit’s factors so that they inform application of the general
principle. Part I provides an overview of Rule 10b-5 and the
elements for civil enforcement actions, criminal prosecutions,
and private causes of action under the Rule. Part II analyzes
the Supreme Court’s decisions with respect to the “in
connection with” requirement and suggests that those
decisions, together with Rule 10b-5’s text, support an intentbased interpretation of the “in connection with” requirement.
Part II also articulates a reasonable intent-based principle for
the requirement. Part III explores Pirate Investor and the
Third and Tenth Circuit cases on which Pirate Investor bases
three of the four factors in its multifactor test. Part III
asserts that the Supreme Court’s misappropriation test—
which is the first factor in the Fourth Circuit’s test—should
be limited to misappropriation cases and that the Fourth
Circuit’s factors should be modified in a manner consistent
with the general principle described in Part II. Finally, the
Article concludes that a fraud should be considered to be “in
connection with” a securities transaction only when the
perpetrator of the fraud intends to influence, or knows or is
reckless in not knowing that his or her actions could
influence, an investment decision. It also concludes that
Pirate Investor’s multifactor test, when guided by and
modified to serve this principle, provides a workable
framework for determining when a fraud is “in connection
16. Id. (“[W]e do not presume to exclude other factors that could help
distinguish between fraud in the securities industry and common law fraud that
happens to involve securities.”).
17. Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 196 F.3d 833, 834
(7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir.
1986)).
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with” the purchase or sale of a security for purposes of Rule
10b-5.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF RULE 10B-5

The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 in 1942 pursuant to its
authority under Exchange Act section 10(b). 18 The Rule
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 19

Rule 10b-5 proscribes three different categories of
fraud 20: (i) misstatements, 21 (ii) misleading statements, 22 and
(iii) pure omissions (i.e., silence) when there is a duty to
disclose. 23 The Rule applies, however, only when a false or
misleading statement or omission is material—that is, when
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 729 (1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d
Cir. 1952).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
20. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND ANALYSIS 281 (3d ed. 2011) (identifying “omissions in breach of
fiduciary duty,” “half-truths,” and “affirmative misstatements” as three
categories of Rule 10b-5 fraud).
21. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o
make any untrue statement of a material fact.”).
22. See id. (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”)
23. See id. § 240.10b-5(a), (c); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230
(1980) (indicating that liability for a failure to disclose material information
only arises if there is a duty to disclose); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–53 (1972) (noting that Rule 10b-5’s prohibition
against fraud by omission when there is a duty to disclose is found in the first
and third subparagraphs of the Rule).
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there is a “substantial likelihood that the [statement or
omission] . . . would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information available.” 24 Moreover, a Rule 10b-5 action is
viable only if the defendant acted with scienter, which the
Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder defined as “a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud” 25 and which lower courts have expanded to include
reckless behavior. 26
The SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice, and private
plaintiffs have recourse under Rule 10b-5. 27 Although the
text of the Rule does not specify a private cause of action,
courts have found that one is implied. 28 Standing for a
private cause of action, however, is limited to purchasers and
sellers of securities and does not extend to those who fail to
purchase or sell securities because of fraudulent
24. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
25. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). The Court
stated expressly that it was not ruling on whether recklessness may constitute
scienter. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (1976) (“We need not address
here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is
sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”). In Aaron v. SEC, the
Supreme Court determined that scienter also is required for SEC enforcement
actions. Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); See HAZEN, supra note 6, §
12.8[1], at 457 (“The Supreme Court . . . held in Aaron v. SEC that the scienter
standard applies under Rule 10b-5 regardless of whether the action is one for
damages or an enforcement action brought by the Commission.”).
26. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Reckless
conduct may also constitute scienter.”); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs
Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[L]iability requires proof of the
defendant’s ‘scienter,’ which is to say proof that he either knew the statement
was false or was reckless in disregarding the substantial risk that it was
false.”); ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 n.3 (2d Cir.
2007) (“In a Rule 10b-5 action, scienter requires a showing of ‘intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud,’ or reckless conduct.”) (citations omitted); Robert N.
Clemens Trust v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“[W]e have ‘long premised liability on at least reckless behavior.’ ”); Hollinger v.
Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Our circuit, . . . along
with ten other circuits, has held that recklessness may satisfy the element of
scienter in a civil action for damages under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2006) (authorizing SEC actions to enforce rules
under the Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006) (providing for fines and
imprisonment).
28. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730–31 (1975);
see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) (“It is now established that a private right of action is implied under §
10(b).”).
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misstatements or omissions. 29
To be successful in a civil enforcement action, a criminal
prosecution, or a private cause of action, the SEC, the
Department of Justice, or the private plaintiff must prove
that the defendant made a material misstatement or
omission, that the defendant acted with scienter, and that the
misstatement or omission was made “in connection with” a
securities transaction. 30 A private plaintiff must go further
and prove that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the
misstatement or omission and that the misstatement or
omission caused the plaintiff’s loss. 31
Although reliance—or “transaction causation,” as it is
sometimes called 32—is an element of a private cause of action
under Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court in two respects has
significantly curtailed the burden on plaintiffs to prove
reliance. First, a plaintiff need not show reliance at all if the
fraud is by means of a pure omission. In such a case,
according to the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, “[a]ll that is necessary is that the facts
withheld be material.” 33 Second, for securities traded in an
efficient market, a plaintiff may qualify for a rebuttable
presumption of reliance. In Basic v. Levinson, the Court
validated a presumption of reliance employed by the Sixth
29. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730–31 (noting that, in Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined
that plaintiffs in a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 were “limited to
actual purchasers and sellers of securities” and holding that Birnbaum was
decided correctly).
30. See S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2009)
(listing the elements of a civil enforcement action); Semerenko v. Cendant
Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2000) (listing the elements of a private cause of
action); United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207,
1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (same).
31. See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 174 (listing the elements of a private cause
of action); Wharf, 210 F.3d at 1220 (same); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008) (listing the elements of a
private cause of action); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005)
(“A private plaintiff who claims securities fraud must prove that the defendant’s
fraud caused an economic loss.”).
32. Dura Pharm. Inc., 544 U.S. at 341; see HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.11, at
479–80 (“The concept of transaction causation has been properly characterized
as nothing more than ‘but for’ causation, and more questionably as merely
another way of describing reliance. Although reliance and causation constitute
distinct elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim, transaction causation may be
established by facts that establish reliance.”) (internal quotations omitted).
33. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
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Circuit when a plaintiff proves:
(1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2)
that the misrepresentations were material; (3) that the
shares were traded on an efficient market; (4) that the
misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying
investor to misjudge the value of the shares; and (5) that
the plaintiff traded the shares between the time the
misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was
revealed. 34

The Supreme Court has devoted considerable attention to
the elements for a Rule 10b-5 action, particularly those
necessary for a private cause of action. Its consideration of
the “in connection with” requirement, however, has been
meager at best. Yet, as the Third Circuit observed in
Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., “the ‘in connection with’ phrase
is not the least difficult aspect of the 10b-5 complex to tie
down.” 35
II. THE “IN CONNECTION WITH” REQUIREMENT
A. Bankers Life, O’Hagan, and Zandford
The Supreme Court first addressed Rule 10b-5’s “in
connection with” requirement in Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., a case that involved a complex
scheme under which the purchaser of a corporation’s stock
misappropriated corporate assets to pay the purchase price of
the stock. 36 Bankers Life & Casualty Company owned all of
the stock of Manhattan Casualty Co., a casualty insurance
company, and had agreed to sell the stock to James Begole.37
Among Manhattan’s assets were U.S. Treasury bonds valued
at approximately five million dollars, the purchase price
under the agreement. 38 To complete the purchase of the
Manhattan stock, Begole and others working with him
orchestrated a series of transactions in which they caused
Manhattan to sell the Treasury bonds for their full market
value and misappropriated the proceeds to repay a short-term
34. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988).
35. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 174.
36. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971).
37. Id. at 7; see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430
F.2d 355, 357 (2d Cir. 1970).
38. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 8.
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loan taken out to pay the purchase price for the Manhattan
shares. 39 Meanwhile, they made it appear as if Manhattan
had used the proceeds to purchase a certificate of deposit. 40
The transactions rendered Manhattan insolvent, and the
New York Department of Insurance eventually instituted
liquidation proceedings. 41 In the course of liquidation, the
Superintendent of Insurance, representing the interests of
Manhattan, filed a lawsuit seeking damages under Rule 10b5 with respect to the sale of Manhattan’s Treasury bonds. 42
Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that Manhattan was
defrauded when members of Manhattan’s board of directors
authorized the sale of the Treasury bonds based on false
representations that the proceeds were to be used to purchase
a certificate of deposit. 43
The Supreme Court determined that Begole’s scheme
represented a fraud on Manhattan “in connection with” the
sale of the Treasury bonds and, accordingly, that the
plaintiff’s claims met Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with”
requirement. 44 The Court reached this conclusion because
Manhattan—the seller of the securities—was harmed by
being deprived of the proceeds of the sale of the bonds
through “deceptive practices touching its sale of securities.” 45
Quoting Shell v. Hensley, the Court observed:
When a person who is dealing with a corporation in a
securities transaction denies the corporation’s directors
access to material information known to him, the
corporation is disabled from availing itself of an informed
judgment on the part of its board regarding the merits of
the transaction. In this situation the private right of
action recognized under Rule 10b-5 is available as a
remedy for the corporate disability. 46

39. Id.
40. Id. at 8–9.
41. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083,
1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Bankers Life, 430 F.2d at 358.
42. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 7.
43. Bankers Life, 430 F.2d at 360.
44. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 9. Although the complaint alleged fraud in
connection with the sale of the Manhattan stock, the Court’s opinion only
addressed whether the fraud was “in connection with” the sale of the Treasury
bonds. Id. at 13 n.10.
45. Id. at 10, 12–13 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 13 (quoting Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970)).
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Sadly, the Court in Bankers Life did not offer a concrete test
to apply broadly to Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with”
requirement.
The Supreme Court waited more than twenty-five years
after Bankers Life before considering Rule 10b-5’s
transactional nexus requirement again. In United States v.
O’Hagan, the Court considered whether trading in securities
of a company based on information misappropriated from
someone other than the company represents fraud “in
connection with” a securities transaction in violation of the
restrictions against insider trading under Rule 10b-5. 47
Dorsey & Whitney, a Minnesota law firm, represented Grand
Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met) with respect to a possible
tender offer for Pillsbury Company. 48 Before the tender offer
became public, James O’Hagan, a partner of the firm who was
not working on the transaction, purchased Pillsbury common
stock and options. 49 When the tender offer was announced,
the price of Pillsbury’s stock rose considerably and O’Hagan
sold his stock and options for a $4.3 million profit. 50
Whether O’Hagan violated Rule 10b-5 depended on
whether O’Hagan’s trading on the basis of his information
about the tender offer was fraud and, if so, whether the fraud
was “in connection with” his securities transactions. The
Court easily found that O’Hagan had engaged in a fraud. 51
Noting that it had previously determined that “[t]he
undisclosed misappropriation of . . . information, in violation
of a fiduciary duty, . . . constitutes fraud,” 52 the Court
concluded that O’Hagan committed a fraud on both his law
firm and Grant Met because, as a partner of the firm, he owed
a duty to them with respect to the information about the
tender offer and violated that duty by taking the information
and using the information for his own benefit. 53
The “in connection with” requirement posed a more
difficult question for the Court. The law firm and Grand Met
were not parties to O’Hagan’s securities transactions, and
47. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
48. Id. at 647.
49. Id. at 647–48.
50. Id. at 648.
51. Id. at 653.
52. Id. at 654.
53. See id. at 653 (noting that O’Hagan’s indictment charged him with
breaching a duty of trust due his firm and its client).
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O’Hagan did not deceive the other parties to the transactions
because he did not owe them any duty to disclose the
information he had. 54 Nevertheless, the Court found that
O’Hagan’s fraud was “in connection with” his purchase of the
Pillsbury stock and options, reasoning that O’Hagan’s
misappropriation of the information about the Pillsbury
tender offer “coincided” with his trading in the Pillsbury
securities. 55 In adopting this “misappropriation theory” of
insider trading, the Court observed that the “in connection
with” requirement “is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud
is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the
confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his
principle, he uses the information to purchase or sell
securities.” 56
The Court asserted that its adoption of the
“misappropriation theory” was consistent with the purposes
of the Exchange Act because the theory was necessary to
protect the integrity of the securities markets. 57 According to
the Court,
The theory is . . . well tuned to an animating purpose of
the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and
thereby promote investor confidence. . . . Although
informational disparity is inevitable in securities markets,
investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a
market where trading based on misappropriated
nonpublic information is unchecked by law. 58

The Court warned, however, that its misappropriation
theory has limits and not all misappropriations that involve
securities are subject to Rule 10b-5. 59 For example, according
54. Id. at 653 n.5. The Court observed that, under the classical theory of
insider trading, the insider’s deception is perpetrated on the other party to the
transaction. Id. at 653. The insider owes a duty of trust and confidence to the
shareholders of his or her corporation, and when the insider trades in securities
of the corporation based on material, nonpublic information without disclosing
the information to the other party to the transaction, the insider breaches a
duty to the other party to the transaction because the other party either is an
existing shareholder (in the case of a purchase) or a future shareholder (in the
case of a sale). See id. at 652 (noting that insiders owe a duty to the
shareholders of the corporation and that trading without disclosing material,
nonpublic information violates the duty and constitutes a deception).
55. Id. at 656.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 653.
58. Id. at 658.
59. See id. at 656.
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to the Court, Rule 10b-5 would not apply when a person
obtains money by fraud and then uses that money to
purchase securities. 60 In such a case, the fraud is not
sufficiently connected to the securities transaction because
the money fraudulently obtained can be used for any number
of purposes. 61 The Court noted that, in contrast, use of
information of the type that O’Hagan obtained is more limited
and typically is valuable only to the extent that it can be used
to secure an advantage in a securities transaction. 62
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan once again failed to
express a general principle for Rule 10b-5’s transactional
nexus requirement. The Court did, however, provide a test
for the requirement in the context of fraud accomplished
through misappropriation. In a misappropriation case, the
requirement is met—i.e., a fraud “coincides” with a securities
transaction—when the securities transaction is necessary to
complete the fraud. 63 This is so even if the person on the
other side of the transaction is not the one defrauded. 64
The Supreme Court returned to Rule 10b-5’s
transactional nexus requirement most recently in SEC v.
Zandford, a case involving a broker’s theft of proceeds of sales
of his clients’ securities. 65 Charles Zandford managed a
discretionary securities account for William Wood and his
daughter. 66 According to the SEC, without the Woods’
authorization or disclosure to them, Zandford had written
checks to himself that, for payment, required liquidation of
securities in the Woods’ account. 67 Consequently, the SEC
asserted, Zandford had committed fraud “in connection with”
a securities transaction in violation of Rule 10b-5. 68
Taking the allegations in the SEC’s complaint as true,
the Court determined that the SEC had alleged conduct that
60. Id. at 656.
61. Id. at 656–57.
62. See id. at 657 (noting that information of the type at issue in the case
“ordinarily” is valuable because it can be used in trading securities).
63. See id. at 656 (“This element is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud is
consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but
when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase
or sell securities.”).
64. Id.
65. S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
66. Id. at 815.
67. Id. at 821.
68. Id. at 816.
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met the “in connection with” requirement. 69 According to the
Court, Zandford’s alleged fraud consisted not of a
misrepresentation to the Woods, but of Zandford’s failure to
disclose to them his intention to execute sales of their
securities and misappropriate the proceeds. 70 This fraud, the
Court concluded, “coincided” with the securities transactions
because
[t]he securities sales and [Zandford’s] fraudulent practices
were not independent events. This is not a case in which,
after a lawful transaction had been consummated, a
broker decided to steal the proceeds and did so. Nor is it a
case in which a thief simply invested the proceeds of a
routine conversion in the stock market.
Rather,
[Zandford’s] fraud coincided with the sales themselves. 71

The Court determined that, as a result, the SEC had met the
pleading requirement for the “in connection with”
requirement. 72
The Supreme Court looked to Bankers Life to support its
conclusions. It noted that, “[l]ike the company directors in
Bankers Life, the Woods were injured as investors through
[Zandford’s] deceptions, which deprived them of any
compensation for the sale of their valuable securities.” 73 The
Court drew on Bankers Life further, observing that a fraud
need not affect the value of the securities involved or the
“integrity of the securities markets” to meet the “in
connection with” requirement. 74 Moreover, according to the
Court, the fraud in Zandford posed a greater danger to the
market than the one in Bankers Trust because a fraud of the
type in Zandford “[n]ot only . . . prevent[s] investors from
trusting that their brokers are executing transactions for
their benefit, but [also] undermines the value of a
discretionary account.” 75
Without any analysis, the Court in Zandford refused to
read O’Hagan to require, in the case of fraud through
misappropriation, that the misappropriated assets “not have

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 825.
Id. at 820–21.
Id. at 820.
See id.
See id. at 822.
Id.
Id. 822–23.
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independent value to the client outside the securities
market.” 76 It observed, however, that even if O’Hagan
imposed such a requirement, the fraud at issue in Zandford
met the requirement. According to the Court, “the Woods’
securities did not have value for [Zandford] apart from their
use in a securities transaction and [therefore] the fraud was
not complete before the sale of securities occurred.” 77
The “touch” test under Bankers Life and the requirement
under O’Hagan and Zandford that a fraud “coincide” with a
securities transaction are so vague that they cannot serve as
a meaningful general principle for applying Rule 10b-5’s “in
connection with” requirement. The cases nevertheless are
useful because they set out some of the boundaries for the
transactional nexus requirement and establish a test for
courts to apply in cases involving fraud accomplished through
misappropriation.
Bankers Life, O’Hagan, and Zandford describe several
parameters for Rule 10b-5’s transaction nexus. First, the
Rule must be “construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.’ ” 78 Second, while
Rule 10b-5 is designed to “insure honest securities markets,” 79
its remedial purposes reach beyond that goal. 80 Therefore,
Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement can be met
even if a “transaction is not conducted through a securities
exchange or an organized over-the-counter market.” 81 Third,
the fraud need not relate to the price or value of a security. 82
76. Id. at 824.
77. Id. at 824–25. The court also indicated, however, that Rule 10b-5 does
not require that misappropriated assets “not have [an] independent value.” See
id. at 824.
78. Id. at 819 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 151 (1972) (quoting S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 195 (1963))); see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (“Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and
restrictively.”).
79. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997).
80. See Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12 (“[Section] 10(b) . . . is not ‘limited to
preserving the integrity of the securities markets’, though that purpose is
included.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Zandford, 535 U.S. at 821–22
(noting that, although Bankers Life “recognized that the interest in ‘preserving
the integrity of securities markets’ was one of the purposes animating [section
10(b), it] rejected the notion that § 10(b) is limited to serving that objective
alone.” (citing Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12)).
81. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10.
82. See id. at 12; Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822.
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Fourth, a fraud can be “in connection with” the purchase or
sale of securities even if the deception is not perpetrated on a
party to the transaction. 83 Finally, whether a state law
remedy is available is irrelevant to determining the scope of
Rule 10b-5. 84
Undoubtedly, as to misappropriation cases, Rule 10b-5
applies if a securities transaction is necessary to complete the
fraud. 85 To help explain this necessity test, the Court gave
examples of how it is limited. Specifically, it indicated that, if
the transaction occurs prior to the time the fraudulent
scheme commences, the “in connection with” requirement is
not met. 86 Likewise, the Court stated, the scheme is not “in
connection with” a securities transaction if the scheme is
complete before the transaction occurs. 87
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court intended its
necessity test to apply outside the misappropriation context, 88
but statements by the Court in Bankers Life and Zandford
could be read to support its extension. In Bankers Life, for
instance, the Court described as “irrelevant . . . the fact that
the proceeds of the sale that were due [to Manhattan] were
misappropriated.” 89 Similarly, the Court in Zandford stated
that “[t]he fact that [the defendant] misappropriated the
83. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658 (indicating that section 10(b) “requires
deception ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,’ not deception of
an identifiable purchaser or seller.”).
84. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12.
85. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (noting that the “in connection with”
requirement “is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not
when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without
disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell
securities.”); Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820 (“The securities sales and respondent’s
fraudulent practices were not independent events.”); Zandford, 535 U.S. at 825
(“[T]he fraud was not complete before the sale of securities occurred.”).
86. See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820 (noting that the fraud and the securities
transaction are independent events when, “after a lawful transaction has been
consummated, a broker decided to steal the proceeds and did so.”).
87. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“The Government notes [that] . . . ‘[t]he
misappropriation theory would . . . not apply to a case in which a person
defrauded a bank into giving him a loan or embezzled cash from another, and
then used the proceeds of the misdeed to purchase securities.”); Zandford, 535
U.S. at 820 (noting that the fraud and the securities transaction are
independent when “a thief simply invest[s] the proceeds of a routine conversion
in the stock market.”).
88. Regardless of what the Court may have intended, lower courts have
applied the necessity test in cases not involving misappropriation. See infra
notes 139–40, 159 and accompanying text.
89. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10.
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proceeds of the sales provides persuasive evidence that he
had violated section 10(b) when he made the sales, but
misappropriation is not an essential element of the offense.” 90
One might interpret the Court’s statements to suggest
that its necessity test applies even if a fraud does not involve
misappropriation. A better reading, however, is a more
general one—whether a fraud is “in connection with” a
securities transaction does not turn on whether
misappropriation is involved.
The misappropriation of
proceeds from securities transactions, of course, was not
irrelevant to the Court in Bankers Life.
Without the
misappropriation, there would have been no fraud. What
Bankers Life meant by irrelevance, then, was that the mere
fact that the fraud was a misappropriation of cash did not
mean that there was no connection to a securities transaction.
Zandford confirms this fact and offers a corollary, explaining
that misappropriation is not required for a transaction to
meet the “in connection with” requirement—that there are
other ways for fraud and securities transactions to “coincide.”
B. Uncovering Support for an Intent-Based Principle
Even though the misappropriation test does not
represent a clear, general principle for determining whether a
fraud is “in connection with” a securities transaction for Rule
10b-5 purposes, a general principle underlies the Supreme
Court’s decisions in O’Hagan and Zandford. When examined
closely, the decisions suggest that the intent of the alleged
perpetrator of the fraud is critical to determining whether the
requisite connection exists.
In O’Hagan, the Justice Department tried to distinguish
O’Hagan’s trading based on misappropriated information
regarding Grand Met’s tender offer for Pillsbury, which it
claimed satisfied Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus
requirement, from the use of misappropriated cash to
purchase securities, which it acknowledged did not. 91
Specifically, the government argued that the difference
between the two scenarios is that “confidential information of
the kind at issue [in O’Hagan] derives its value only from its
utility in securities trading,” while “money can be used for all
90. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822.
91. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656–57.
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manner of purposes and purchases.” 92 Consequently, a
securities transaction is necessary to complete a fraud with
respect to the misappropriated information, but not with
respect to misappropriated cash. 93
Justice Thomas charged the government with
exaggeration as to the information’s purported limited use.
He observed that:
O’Hagan could have done any number of things with the
information: He could have sold it to a newspaper for
publication, he could have given or sold the information to
Pillsbury itself, or he could even have kept the information
and used it solely for his personal amusement, perhaps in
a fantasy stock trading game. . . . That O’Hagan actually
did use the information to purchase securities is thus no
more significant here than it is in the case of embezzling
money used to purchase securities. 94

According to Justice Thomas, the government’s argument
failed its own test because a securities transaction was not
necessary to complete a misappropriation of the information. 95
Just as in the case of embezzling money, the fraud was
complete when the information was taken.
The majority in O’Hagan considered the government’s
exaggeration inapposite because the information that
O’Hagan misappropriated “ordinarily” is valuable in trading
securities. 96 According to the Court,
The misappropriation theory targets information of a sort
that misappropriators ordinarily capitalize upon to gain
no-risk profits through the purchase or sale of securities.
Should a misappropriator put such information to other
use, the statute’s prohibition would not be implicated.
The theory does not catch all conceivable forms of fraud
involving confidential information; rather, it catches
92. Id. at 657.
93. Id. at 656 (noting the government’s claim that, in the case of
embezzlement of funds and subsequent use to purchase securities, “ the fraud
would be complete as soon as the money was obtained.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
94. Id. at 685–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 686 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Under any theory of liability,
however, these activities would not violate § 10(b) and, according to the
Commission's monetary embezzlement analogy, these possibilities are sufficient
to preclude a violation under the misappropriation theory even where the
informational property was used for securities trading.”).
96. Id. at 657–58.
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fraudulent means of capitalizing on such information
through securities transactions. 97

The majority’s conclusion therefore rests, not on the fact
that the only fraud O’Hagan could have accomplished with
the information was through a securities transaction, but on
the fact that O’Hagan’s actual fraud was completed through a
securities transaction. The focus of the “in connection with”
inquiry, then, is on whether a securities transaction was
necessary to complete not just any fraud, but the fraud—the
one the defendant perpetrated.
Of course, the fact that the actual use of the information
is critical to determining whether the “in connection with”
requirement is met does not necessarily mean that the
defendant’s intent is critical. Following O’Hagan, one is left
to wonder whether the “in connection with” requirement is
met if a fiduciary deceptively takes confidential information
for a purpose other than trading, uses it for that other
purpose, and later decides to trade based on the information.
Under the Court’s analysis, it seems that the fiduciary would
have completed her misappropriation when she used the
information for her non-trading purpose. Would the Court
then also find that completion of her initially-contemplated
misappropriation is sufficient to break the transactional
nexus even though she ultimately engaged in a securities
transaction based on the information?
Early in its opinion, the Court in O’Hagan suggested that
the purpose of the misappropriation—what the defendant
intends to do with the information—is significant. 98
Specifically, the Court stated that “[t]he ‘misappropriation
theory’ holds that a person commits fraud ‘in connection with’
a securities transaction, and thereby violates section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a
Later,
duty owed to the source of the information.” 99
however, the Court seems to indicate that the actual use of
97. Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 652.
99. Id. (emphasis added); see also O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 681 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“The majority states, for example, that the misappropriation theory
applies to undisclosed misappropriation of confidential information ‘for
securities trading purposes,’ thus seeming to require a particular intent by the
misappropriator in order to satisfy the ‘in connection with’ language.”)
(emphasis added).
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the information, and not the person’s intent, is the significant
element for the “in connection with” requirement. According
to the Court, the requirement “is satisfied because the
fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary
gains the confidential information, but when, without
disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to
purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and the
The Court’s opinion,
breach of duty thus coincide.” 100
therefore, is ambiguous as to whether the intent of the
perpetrator of the fraud is critical to the “in connection with”
requirement.
Zandford, however, confirms that intent indeed is the
critical element. In Zandford, the Court highlighted the
importance of the timing of Zandford’s decision to
misappropriate funds from the Woods and what he knew
would be necessary to do so. According to the Court,
[t]he securities sales and [Zandford’s] fraudulent practices
were not independent events. This is not a case in which,
after a lawful transaction had been consummated, a
broker decided to steal the proceeds and did so. Nor is it a
case in which a thief simply invested the proceeds of a
routine conversion in the stock market.
Rather,
[Zandford’s] fraud coincided with the sales themselves. . . .
With regard to the sales of shares in the Woods’ mutual
fund, [Zandford] initiated these transactions by writing a
check to himself from that account, knowing that
redeeming the check would require the sale of
securities.” 101

For the Court in Zandford, then, it was important that the
defendant knew that a securities transaction was required to
achieve his desired outcome. It was important that the
securities transaction was an intended part of the fraud.
Thus, following Zandford, it appears that, to determine
whether the “in connection with” requirement is met with
respect to a misappropriation, one must define the
defendant’s fraud by looking to the defendant’s state of mind.
To illustrate this point, consider the following four scenarios:
Scenario One:
Without her client’s knowledge or
authorization, a broker sells $1000 of her client’s securities,
100. Id. at 656.
101. S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820–21 (2002) (emphasis added).
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intending to steal the proceeds. After the sale, the broker
steals the $1000 sale proceeds.
Scenario Two: With her client’s authorization, a broker
sells $1000 of her client’s securities. After the sale, the
broker decides to steal the $1000 sale proceeds and, without
her client’s knowledge, does so.
Scenario Three: Without Company A’s knowledge or
authorization, an officer of Company A takes confidential
information from Company A, intending to use it to trade in
the securities of Company B. After the officer takes the
information, the officer trades in securities of Company B,
reaping profits of $1000.
Scenario Four: Without Company A’s knowledge or
authorization, an officer of Company A takes confidential
information from Company A for the purpose of competing
with Company A. After using the information to compete
with Company A, the officer decides to trade in the securities
of Company B based on Company A’s information. The officer
trades as planned, reaping profits of $1000.
The substantive result in Scenarios One and Two is the
same—the client’s securities are sold and the broker
wrongfully ends up with the $1000 in sale proceeds. Under
Zandford, however, only Scenario One satisfies the “in
In a broad sense, a
connection with” requirement. 102
securities transaction was necessary to complete both frauds.
Without the securities transaction, no cash would have been
available for the broker to take. The difference between the
two scenarios, however—and the reason why Scenario One
satisfies the requirement and Scenario Two does not—is one
of intent. In both cases, the fraud began when the broker
decided to take the sale proceeds and ended when the broker
actually did so. The significant difference is that, in Scenario
One, the transaction occurred while the broker had the intent
102. Scenario One mimics Zandford’s facts. Scenario Two represents a
sequence of events that Zandford indicates would not satisfy the “in connection
with” requirement. See id. at 820 (“This is not a case in which, after a lawful
transaction had been consummated, a broker decided to steal the proceeds and
did so.”).
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to commit the fraud and, in Scenario Two, the transaction
already had occurred when the broker formed her intent. In
Scenario One, the broker’s fraudulent intent and the
securities transaction coincided, and the broker intended the
securities transaction as part of the fraudulent scheme.
Like Scenarios One and Two, the substantive result in
Scenarios Three and Four is the same—the officer takes
Company A’s confidential information and gains $1000 in
trading profits by trading in securities of Company B.
Scenario Three undoubtedly satisfies the “in connection with”
requirement under O’Hagan, and though the result for
Scenario Four is unclear under O’Hagan, Zandford suggests
that the requirement would not be met. Again, the difference
is one of intent. In both scenarios, the fraud began when the
officer took the information and ended when she used it for
her intended purpose. In Scenario Three, her intended
purpose was to trade, and the fraud was not complete until
she traded. A securities transaction, therefore, was required
to complete her fraud. In Scenario Four, in contrast, the
officer’s intended purpose was to compete, and the fraud was
completed when she used the information to compete. Her
securities transaction occurred after her fraud was complete,
and therefore, the fraud was not “in connection with” the
securities transaction for purposes of Rule 10b-5.
O’Hagan and Zandford are not the only sources of
support for an intent-based interpretation of Rule 10b-5’s
transactional nexus requirement. Such an interpretation also
finds support in the policy underpinnings of Exchange Act
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The two principal goals of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are deterring securities fraud
and compensating the victims of securities fraud. 103 The text
of the statute and the Rule suggests that the “in connection
with” requirement primarily is meant to serve the deterrence
goal. In their essence, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 represent
a means for civil antifraud enforcement by the SEC and
criminal antifraud enforcement by the Department of
Justice. 104 This is evident from the fact that both the statute
103. See Donald Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter (and the Securities
Fraud Case Against Martha Stewart that Never Happened), 10 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1, 9 (2006) (identifying “deterrence [and] compensatory effect” as policy
considerations).
104. See HAZEN, supra note 6, § 16.2[8], at 653 (“SEC investigations that
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and the Rule describe the proscribed conduct as “unlawful” 105
and make no mention of a private cause of action. 106 Because
the statute and the Rule are written in this way, it is logical
to read the elements that the SEC or the Department of
Justice must prove as serving one the goals of punishment,
which deterrence is, but compensation is not. 107
Compensation, of course, ordinarily is achieved through a
private cause of action under the Rule. Consequently, the
elements unique to a private cause of action—reliance and
causation— should be interpreted in light of that goal. 108
The transactional nexus requirement is an element
required for civil and criminal enforcement of Rule 10b-5 109
and therefore should be read in a way that primarily serves
the goal of deterrence. An intent-based general principle for
the requirement does just that. A person will not be deterred
from fraudulently influencing an investment decision 110 if she
reveal wrongdoing may result in SEC injunction actions brought in federal
district court. Alternatively, the SEC can refer the case to the Department of
Justice to determine if criminal sanctions are appropriate.”); 15 U.S.C. §
78u(d)(1) (2006) (authorizing the SEC to seek injunctive relief and to provide
evidence to the Attorney General for criminal proceedings regarding violations
of the Exchange Act); id. § 78u(d)(3) (2006) (authorizing the SEC to seek civil
penalties for violations of the Exchange Act); id. § 78ff(a) (2006) (providing for
fines and imprisonment for violations of the Exchange Act).
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
106. Neither the history of the statute nor the Rule suggests that Congress or
the SEC contemplated a private cause of action. See Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729–30 (1975) (“Nor does the history of
[section 10(b)] provide any indication that Congress considered the problem of
private suits under it at the time of passage. Similarly there is no indication
that the Commission in adopting Rule 10b-5 considered the question of private
civil remedies under this provision.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 196 (1976). (“[Section] 10(b) does not by its terms create an express civil
remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that Congress, or the
Commission when it adopted Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a remedy . . . .”).
107. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the
Deterrence Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of
Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 907–08 (noting that theories of punishment
include retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, specific deterrence, and
general deterrence).
108. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting the additional
elements that a private plaintiff must prove under Rule 10b-5).
109. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting that the SEC and the
Department of Justice, as well as private plaintiffs, must meet the “in
connection with” requirement to be successful in enforcing Rule 10b-5).
110. Because a purchase or sale is not required for an SEC civil enforcement
action or for a criminal prosecution, see infra note 133 and accompanying text,
the object of the fraud must be broader than a securities transaction. One of the
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should not reasonably know her actions might have that
influence. Extending the “in connection with” requirement
beyond a culpable statement of mind, therefore, extends it too
far—to a point where it no longer serves as a deterrent.
Although O’Hagan and Zandford, together with the
text of Rule 10b-5, suggest an intent-based general principle
for
interpreting
Rule
10b-5’s
transactional
nexus
requirement, other courts have used causation as a general
principle. For example, the Third Circuit in Semerenko v.
Cendant Corp., a case from which the Fourth Circuit in Pirate
Investor draws one of its factors, claimed that “the ‘in
connection with’ language requires a causal connection
between the claimed fraud and the purchase or sale of a
security.” 111 A causation-based general principle, however, is
inconsistent with Rule 10b-5’s essence as a tool for civil
enforcement by the SEC and criminal enforcement by the
Department of Justice. Moreover, it is inappropriate in light
of the elements of Rule 10b-5’s implied private cause of
action.
As indicated in Part II, the “in connection with”
requirement is an element both of the prima facie case for
civil or criminal enforcement of Rule 10b-5 and for a private
cause of action thereunder. Causation, on the other hand,
only is an element of a private cause of action. If the “in
connection with” requirement simply contemplates a causal
connection, the causation element for a private cause of action
is redundant—at least to a degree.
There are two different types of causation that a private
plaintiff must prove—reliance (or transaction causation) and
loss causation. The redundancy created by interpreting the
transactional nexus to require causation largely relates to
reliance 112 and becomes apparent when one compares the
early cases involving the “in connection with” requirement looked to the
investing public as the relevant object. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Accordingly, we hold that Rule 10b-5 is
violated whenever assertions are made, as here, in a manner reasonably
calculated to influence the investing public . . . .”).
111. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 175 (3d Cir. 2000). The
Seventh Circuit appears to take a similar approach. See S.E.C. v. Jakubowski,
150 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Many of this court’s cases say that a
misrepresentation can be ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of securities
only if it influences an investment decision.”).
112. Angelastro, however, suggests a causation requirement that overlaps
with the loss causation element of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5.
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elements under Semerenko for finding a causal connection
sufficient to establish a transactional nexus to the elements
under Basic for a plaintiff to qualify for a presumption of
reliance. According to the Third Circuit in Semerenko,
Th[e] purpose [of Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] is
best satisfied by a rule that recognizes the realistic causal
effect that material misrepresentations, which raise the
public’s interest in particular securities, tend to have on
the investment decisions of market participants who trade
in those securities. We therefore . . . hold that the Class
may establish the ‘in connection with’ element simply by
showing that the misrepresentations in question were
disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a
reasonable investor would rely, and that they were
material when disseminated. 113

The Supreme Court in Basic similarly stated that, “[i]ndeed,
nearly every court that has considered the proposition has
concluded that where materially misleading statements have
been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market
for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs on the
integrity of the market price may be presumed.” 114 Thus, the
components of Semerenko’s transactional nexus test and
Basic’s requirement for a rebuttable presumption of reliance
are so similar that, in most cases, if a fraud meets
Semerenko’s “in connection with” test, the plaintiff also will
qualify for Basic’s presumption of reliance. Because a
transactional nexus and reliance are separate and distinct
elements under Rule 10b-5, 115 such an overlap indicates that
Compare Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir.
1985) (“As noted, this Court has construed the ‘in connection with’ language as
requiring some causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and
the harm incurred when a security is purchased or sold.”) with Dura Pharm.,
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (noting that a private cause of action
under Rule 10b-5 requires a plaintiff to prove “ ‘loss causation,’ i.e., a causal
connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss”) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)).
113. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176 (emphasis added).
114. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (emphasis added).
115. See S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“Defendants’ argument treats the concepts of ‘reliance’ and ‘in connection with’
as interchangeable, but they are distinct.”).
The transactional nexus
requirement and reliance must be separate elements because a transactional
nexus is required for a civil enforcement or criminal action, but reliance is not.
See supra notes 30–31 (distinguishing civil enforcement and criminal actions
from private causes of action).
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a causation-based principle for the “in connection with”
requirement is unsuitable. 116
In addition, a causation-based principle inappropriately
focuses the transactional nexus inquiry on the plaintiff. As
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
observed in Roland v. Green:
Viewing the allegations from the plaintiffs’ perspective . . .
asks the wrong question.
By tying the ‘coincide’
requirement to ‘inducement,’ it unnecessarily imports
causation into a test whose language (‘coincide’)
specifically disclaims it.
[A] defendant-oriented
perspective . . . is more faithful to the Court’s statement
[in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit]
that ‘[t]he requisite showing . . . is deception in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security,’ not deception of
an identifiable purchaser or seller. 117
116. One might argue that Semerenko’s transactional nexus principle is
distinct from the reliance element of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5
because satisfaction of Semerenko’s principle results only in a presumption of
reliance and does not actually satisfy the reliance element. See Semerenko, 223
F.3d at 179 (“The fraud on the market theory of reliance, however, creates only
a presumption, which the defendant may rebut by raising any defense to actual
reliance.”). Such an argument, however, ignores how Basic’s presumption may
be rebutted and the practical realities of litigating a large swath of Rule 10b-5
cases—class actions with respect to securities traded in an efficient market.
Basic indicates that the presumption of reliance may be rebutted by “[a]ny
showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either
the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair
market price . . . .” Basic, 485 U.S. at 248. If a class action defendant can sever
the link by showing that the misrepresentation did not affect the price, then the
misrepresentation very likely is not material and the plaintiff could not satisfy
Semerenko’s causal connection test or qualify for Basic’s presumption because
materiality is an element of each. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD,
SECURITIES REGULATION ESSENTIALS 134 (2008) (indicating that the lack of
effect of a misrepresentation on the price of a security indicates that the
misrepresentation is not material); see also In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
432 F.3d 261, 274 (3d Cir. 2005) (“If a company’s stock trades on an efficient
market, . . . ‘the materiality of disclosed information may be measured post hoc
by looking to the movement, in the period immediately following disclosure, of
the price of the firm's stock.’ ”). If a defendant in a class action cannot sever the
link between the misrepresentation and the price, the defendant is left with
trying to sever the link between the misrepresentation and the decision to
trade, which “is not feasible to [do] for every member of the class.” CHOI &
PRITCHARD, supra, at 135. Consequently, in a large class action with respect to
a security traded on a national securities exchange, by qualifying for a
rebuttable presumption of reliance, the plaintiffs, for all practical purposes,
have established the reliance element.
117. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 519 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006)); see also
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An intent-based general principle appropriately focuses
the inquiry on the defendant and therefore is consistent with
how the Supreme Court has characterized the “in connection
with” requirement. One might argue, however, that an
intent-based interpretation would overlap with Rule 10b-5’s
scienter requirement and therefore would suffer from the
same problem a causation-based interpretation does vis-à-vis
reliance. As Donald Langevoort points out, however, when
determining scienter, “the relevant question is not motive or
purpose but awareness—[whether] the defendant [knew] . . .
that what she was saying was false.” 118 Moreover, Professor
Langevoort suggests that, although the Second Circuit in
AUSA Life Insurance Co. v. Ernst & Young described the
scienter issue as one of foreseeability of the result,
foreseeability “may not be the precise articulation” of the
meaning of scienter because foreseeability has been the
dominant standard for the “in connection with”
requirement. 119 Instead, he asserts, scienter encompasses
“[a]n appreciation of the falsity by the speaker.” 120 The
element of scienter under Rule 10b-5, then, considers whether
the defendant had the intent to deceive, defraud, or
manipulate or knew or recklessly failed to appreciate that her
action would have that effect; 121 it does not focus on the object
of the intent, knowledge, or recklessness (e.g., whether an
investment decision or something else).
O’Hagan and Zandford confirm that an intent-based
interpretation of the transactional nexus requirement does
not result in conflating the requirement with scienter. Under
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997). (“The misappropriation
theory comports with § 10(b)’s language, which requires deception ‘in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security,’ not deception of an identifiable
purchaser or seller.”).
118. See Langevoort, supra note 103, at 6. Professor Langevoort notes that
the district court in U.S. v. Stewart “misunderstood the law” when it dismissed
the criminal prosecution of Martha Stewart under Rule 10b-5 because the court
had concluded that “a reasonable jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Stewart intended to deceive investors.” Id. at 5.
119. Id. at 6. See AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 221 (2d
Cir. 2000) (noting that the district court focused on the defendant’s motive and
that such a focus “inappropriately makes the scienter issue one of ‘what did the
defendant want to happen’ as opposed to ‘what could the defendant reasonably
foresee as a potential result of his action.’ ”).
120. Langevoort, supra note 103, at 6.
121. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text (describing how courts
have interpreted the meaning of “scienter”).
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O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory, “a person commits fraud
‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby
violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he
misappropriates confidential information for securities
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of
the information.” 122 Therefore, under O’Hagan, a person
violates Rule 10b-5 when he or she has both an intent to
deceive and an intent to trade. If a person discloses to the
source of the information his or her intent to trade, Rule 10b5 is not violated because the person does not have the intent
to deceive, and does not deceive, the source. 123 The person’s
intent to trade, however, persists. Moreover, Zandford
indicates that “if [a] broker told his client he was stealing the
client’s assets, that breach of fiduciary duty might be in
connection with a sale of securities, but it would not involve a
deceptive device or fraud.” 124 Again, there would be no intent
to deceive or actual deception, but the defendant’s intent to
trade would remain.
Thus, based on O’Hagan and Zandford, a defendant’s
state of mind is significant with respect to two separate
elements. The defendant’s intent to deceive is important to
scienter, and the defendant’s intent to engage in a securities
transaction or to take an action that the defendant knows will
require a securities transaction is critical to the “in
connection with” requirement.
C. A Workable Intent-Based Principle
Determining that satisfaction of Rule 10b-5’s “in
connection with” requirement should be measured based on
the intent of the perpetrator of the fraud is only a starting
point. For courts to apply the Rule’s transactional nexus
requirement in a meaningful and consistent manner, they
must have more than just a vague notion of what the
requirement means. To craft a workable general principle
based on intent, two components should be considered: first,
what constitutes intent and, second, what the object of the
122. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
123. Id. at 655 (“Because the deception essential to the misappropriation
theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary
discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information,
there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation . . . .”).
124. S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 n.4 (2002).
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intent is. As discussed below, case law supports a scienterlike definition of intent, and influencing an investment
decision as the object of that intent.
In trying to articulate an intent-based principle for
Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement, the logical
place to look is Rule 10b-5’s other element to which state of
mind is relevant—scienter.
O’Hagan’s adoption of the
misappropriation theory for insider trading indicates that
Rule 10b-5 can apply even in the unusual case when a
defendant’s intent is divided—when the defendant intends to
deceive one person and intends to engage in a securities
transaction with another. 125 In most cases, however, a
defendant’s intent will not be divided. Typically, the person
the defendant intends to deceive will be the very same person
the defendant intends to influence with respect to a securities
transaction. In light of this fact, it is reasonable to interpret
the scope of the “in connection with” requirement in a manner
consistent with the scope of the scienter requirement.
Indeed, although Professor Langevoort notes that the
meaning of scienter is distinct from the “in connection with”
requirement, he approvingly states that, by using for scienter
a standard commonly associated with the “in connection with”
requirement, the Second Circuit in AUSA had “conjoin[ed] the
scienter and ‘in connection with’ tests in a way that makes
holistic sense in defining what constitutes securities fraud.” 126
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court’s landmark case
establishing scienter as a required element for a private
cause of action under Rule 10b-5, 127 the Court stated that
“[t]he words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in conjunction
with ‘device or contrivance’ strongly suggest that § 10(b) was
intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct.”128
As a result, knowledge and specific intent should be
125. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“A misappropriator who trades on the
basis of material, nonpublic information . . . deceives the source of the
information and simultaneously harms members of the investing public.”).
126. See Langevoort, supra note 103, at 6.
127. In Aaron v. SEC, the Supreme Court determined that scienter also is
required for SEC enforcement actions. Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680, 691
(1980); see HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.8[1], at 457 (“The Supreme Court . . . held
in Aaron v. SEC that the scienter standard applies under Rule 10b-5 regardless
of whether the action is one for damages or an enforcement action brought by
the Commission.”).
128. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (emphasis added).
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components of the defendant’s state of mind for purposes of
the “in connection with” requirement. This conclusion is
consistent with the facts of the Supreme Court’s three “in
connection with” cases. In Bankers Life, the defendants
intended to influence the decision of Manhattan’s board of
directors to authorize the sale of Manhattan’s Treasury
bonds. 129 Likewise, the defendant in O’Hagan intended to
engage in securities transactions based on the confidential
information he misappropriated. 130 Finally, in Zandford, the
defendant wrote checks on his clients’ account, knowing that
a securities transaction would be required to fund the
checks. 131
Whether the state of mind applicable to the transactional
nexus requirement should extend to recklessness is unclear
from the Court’s “in connection with” cases, but the Courts of
Appeals generally have recognized recklessness as a
component of scienter. 132 In addition, the Third Circuit in
Semerenko and In re Ames Department Stores Inc. Stock
Litigation addressed recklessness in its consideration of the
“in connection with” requirement. In Semerenko, the court
stated that “under the standard which we adopt [for the
transactional nexus requirement], the [plaintiffs are] not
required to establish that the defendants actually envisioned
that [the plaintiffs] would rely upon the alleged
misrepresentations when making their investment decisions.
Rather, [they] must only show that the alleged
misrepresentations were reckless.” 133 Similarly, in rejecting
129. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 7–9
(1971) (describing a deliberate scheme to mislead the directors).
130. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (noting that information of the type that
O’Hagan misappropriated “ordinarily” is useful only for reaping trading profits).
131. See S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 821 (2002) (“With regard to the
sales of shares in the Woods’ mutual fund, respondent initiated these
transactions by writing a check to himself from that account, knowing that
redeeming the check would require the sale of securities.”).
132. See Findwhat Investor Grp. v. Findwhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“In this Circuit, ‘scienter consists of intent to defraud or severe
recklessness on the part of the defendant.’ ”); Mississippi Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.
v. Boston Scientific Corp., 649 F.3d 5, 20 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Under this circuit's
precedent, proving scienter requires ‘a showing of either conscious intent to
defraud or a high degree of recklessness.’ ”); Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976
F.2d 497, 507 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Scienter may be satisfied by either proof of
actual knowledge or recklessness.”); see also supra note 26 (citing cases
recognizing that recklessness is a component of scienter).
133. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).
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the defendants’ argument that they must have envisioned the
impact of their statements on investors for the statements to
have the requisite connection, the court in Ames stated that
the defendants had disregarded “the well-established rule
that reckless, as well as intentional, manipulation of the
stock market may violate Rule 10b-5.” 134 Thus, it seems
appropriate to include recklessness as a component state of
mind for purposes of the “in connection with” requirement. 135
For purposes of the “in connection with” requirement, the
object of the defendant’s intent must be broader than a
purchase or sale. This is so because Rule 10b-5’s purchase or
sale requirement only applies to standing with respect to a
private cause of action. 136 Neither a purchase nor a sale is
required for civil enforcement by the SEC or criminal
prosecution by the Department of Justice. 137 Bearing this in
134. In re Ames Dep’t Stores Inc. Stock Litig. 991 F.2d 953, 965 (2d Cir.
1993) Semerenko and Ames are interesting because, in one breath, they purport
to establish a causation-based standard for the “in connection with”
requirement and, in another, they discuss intent and the fact that reckless
conduct can violate Rule 10b-5. See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176 (noting that a
causal connection serves the purposes of Rule 10b-5 and then discussing
recklessness); Ames, 991 F.2d at 965–66 (discussing recklessness and then
noting that “statements which manipulate the market price are connected to
resultant stock trading”). It is unclear, however, whether these cases are
merely referring to the Rule’s scienter requirement or are incorporating an
intent element into their “in connection with” tests. Although Semerenko cites
In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig.’s discussion of scienter, the court seems to
suggest that recklessness need only be shown “under the standard which we
adopt” for the “in connection with” requirement. See Semerenko, 223 F.3d at
176 (citing In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Ames mentions scienter specifically, perhaps indicating only that its “in
connection with” rule should be considered with the separate scienter element
in mind. See Ames, 991 F.2d at 965 n.6.
135. Although reckless conduct may satisfy both elements, what constitutes
recklessness may be different under each. For example, Professor Langevoort
suggests that “[a]n appreciation of the falsity by the speaker is all that is
necessary” for scienter, while foreseeability is the prevailing standard used by
courts for the “in connection with” requirement. Langevoort, supra note 103, at
6.
136. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting that a private cause of
action requires a purchase or sale).
137. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 751 n.14
(1975) (“[T]he purchaser-seller rule imposes no limitation on the standing of the
SEC to bring actions for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”); United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 664 (1997). (“Criminal prosecutions do not
present the dangers the Court addressed in Blue Chip Stamps, so that decision
is ‘inapplicable’ to indictments for violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”); S.E.C.
v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993) (“While interpretations
of ‘in connection with’ continue to change as applied to private plaintiffs, its
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mind, in light of Rule 10b-5’s definition of materiality, 138
which focuses on the importance of information to an
investor’s decision, and taking into account how a number of
lower courts have interpreted the “in connection with”
requirement, 139 an investment decision is the proper object of
a defendant’s intent for purposes of the Rule 10-5’s
transactional nexus requirement.
Based on the foregoing, then, one might articulate a
suitable principle as follows: for purposes of Rule 10b-5, a
fraud is “in connection with” a securities transaction only
when the perpetrator of the fraud intends to influence, or
knows or is reckless in not knowing that his or her actions
could influence, an investment decision. Such a principle
appropriately employs scienter-like intent and sets an
investment decision as its object. 140
III. PIRATE INVESTOR’S MULTIFACTOR TEST
In Pirate Investor, the Fourth Circuit considered whether
an e-mail stock tip containing misrepresentations violated

meaning in SEC actions remains as broad and flexible as is necessary to
accomplish the statute’s purpose of protecting investors.”) (citing S.E.C. v.
Hasho, 784 F. Supp. 1059, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); S.E.C. v. Benson, 657 F. Supp.
1122, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); S.E.C. v. Warner, 652 F. Supp. 647, 651 (S.D. Fla.
1987); S.E.C. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 829 (E.D. Wis.
1978); S.E.C. v. Gen. Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1257 (D.D.C. 1975)).
138. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (adopting the
materiality standard from TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
448–49 (1976), which focuses on the importance of information to an investor’s
decision making).
139. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968)
(“[W]e hold that Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are made, as here,
in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public . . . .”);
United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1221 (10th
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he misrepresentations were made to influence UIH's investment
decision and were made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.”);
S.E.C. v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that “only
investment decisions come within Rule 10b-5.”).
140. One might argue this principle is not broad enough to capture insider
trading under the misappropriation theory in which the defendant does not seek
to influence an investment decision by the person from whom she takes the
information or the investment decision of the person on the other side of her
trade. The Seventh Circuit in SEC v. Jakubowski, however, has suggested that
influencing the investment decision of the perpetrator of the fraud is sufficient
for the “in connection with” requirement. See Jakubowski, 150 F.3d at 680
(“Jakubowski . . . made [an] investment decision[] when [he] purchased the
stock issued by the converting S&Ls.”).
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Rule 10b-5. 141 In May 2002, the editor-in-chief of Pirate
Investor, LLC, a publisher of investment newsletters, sent
multiple waves of e-mails containing a stock tip to over
800,000 individuals. 142 The e-mails suggested that, based on
information purportedly obtained from a senior executive of a
mystery company, the editor knew that the mystery company
was going to announce a major transaction on May 22 and
that investors could profit from buying the mystery
company’s stock prior to that time. 143 The e-mails further
indicated that, for $1000, an e-mail recipient could receive a
special report divulging the name of the mystery company. 144
Pirate received over $600,000 from sales of the special report
to over 1200 investors. 145 Unfortunately for those who
purchased the report and then purchased the stock of the
mystery company, May 22 came and went without any
announcement and it turned out that a mystery company
senior executive had not told Pirate’s editor that the
transaction was to be announced on that date. 146
To analyze whether the misrepresentations in Pirate’s emails were “in connection with” a securities transaction for
purposes of Rule 10b-5, the Fourth Circuit applied a
multifactor test that focused on four factors that the court
indicated are neither mandatory nor exhaustive, but rather
serve as a guide. 147 According to the court, the
factors include, but are not limited to: (1) whether a
securities sale was necessary to the completion of the
fraudulent scheme; (2) whether the parties’ relationship
was such that it would necessarily involve trading in
securities; (3) whether the defendant intended to induce a
securities transaction; and (4) whether material
misrepresentations were disseminated to the public in a
medium upon which a reasonable investor would rely. 148

141. S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 2009).
142. Id. at 237–39.
143. Id. at 238.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 239. The opinion does not explain why Pirate received only a
portion of the total net proceeds from the sales. See id. (noting that Pirate
received only $626,500 of the total net proceeds of $1,005,000).
146. Id. at 240.
147. Id. at 244.
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The first factor, of course, is Zandford’s misappropriation
test. 149 The second factor is from the Third Circuit’s decision
in Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc. 150 The Tenth
Circuit’s decision in United International Holdings, Inc. v.
Wharf (Holdings), Inc. supports the third factor. 151 And the
final factor is drawn from Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.,
another Third Circuit case. 152
The Fourth Circuit considered the various factors one-byone, ultimately finding that Pirate’s misrepresentations were
“in connection with” the purchase or sale of security. 153
Although the court’s conclusion was correct, it applied the
factors indiscriminately, without reflection on what the
factors measure or how they should apply. If, instead, the
Fourth Circuit had used the intent-based principle described
in Part II.C to construct and apply its test, the court would
have reached the right conclusion more logically and
efficiently. An examination of the cases supporting each
factor in the Pirate Investor framework and of the Fourth
Circuit’s analysis with respect to each factor reveals where
the court went wrong and how its multifactor test can be
improved and better applied.
A. Securities Sale Necessary to Complete the Fraud
The
Fourth
Circuit
looked
to
Zandford’s
misappropriation test—whether a securities transaction is
necessary to complete the fraud—for its first factor and,
considering the factor relative to the facts in Pirate Investor,
determined that the factor weighed in favor of finding that
Pirate’s misrepresentations were “in connection with” a
securities transaction. The court explained that Pirate sent
out its e-mail in multiple waves. 154 According to the court, the
e-mails in later waves touted stock purchases by investors
who had received earlier e-mails and highlighted the fact that
the mystery company’s stock price had risen, which the
149. Id. (citing S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820–21 (2002)).
150. Id. (citing Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 302–
03 (3d Cir. 2005)).
151. Id. (citing United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d
1207, 1221 (10th Cir. 2000)).
152. Id. (citing Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir.
2000)).
153. Id. at 252.
154. Id. at 245.
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district court found resulted from the earlier purchases. 155
Based on these facts, the court concluded that “[t]he fraud
was not complete when investors paid $1,000 to learn the
identity of the company in question; [the defendants] also
needed those investors to purchase the stock thereby
increasing the stock price so as to boost the credibility of the
solicitation e-mail to obtain more $1,000 payments.” 156
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the first factor is a bit
contrived. While it may be true that Pirate benefited from
actual purchases of the mystery company’s stock, by no
means were the purchases necessary to complete the fraud.
The fraud with respect to each investor was complete when
the investor paid for the special report that revealed the
identity of the mystery company.
Unlike the
misappropriation in Zandford, no intervening securities
transaction was necessary to complete the fraud. Purchases
by earlier investors may have aided Pirate in defrauding later
investors, but purchases of the special reports by later
investors could have been completed without anyone’s having
made a purchase.
To reach the conclusion that securities transactions were
necessary to complete the fraud, the Fourth Circuit stretched
to characterize the “fraudulent scheme” as broadly as
possible. Even when using such a broad characterization, the
court struggled to conclude that purchases of the mystery
company’s securities were necessary to complete Pirate’s
fraud. In various places, the court stated that the defendants
“benefit[ted] from securities trading by the purchasers of
[Pirate’s] Special Report,” that “the rising stock was
important to the success of the scheme,” and that “securities
transactions helped [the defendants] to maximize the
profitability of their scheme.” 157 In only one place, however,
did the court indicate that the defendants needed the
securities transactions, and even there, the necessity wasn’t
to complete the fraud, but to “increase[e] the stock price so as
to boost the credibility of the solicitation e-mail.” 158
Furthermore, whether securities transactions actually would
have boosted the credibility of the e-mails is subject to some
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 245–46.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 245–47 (emphasis added).
Id. at 246.
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question. After all, the e-mails did not give the name of the
mystery company and therefore recipients had no way to
confirm the truth of what the e-mail stated about changes in
the stock price.
The Fourth Circuit went astray with the first factor by
applying it too rigidly. The Supreme Court has not suggested
that the Zandford test ought to apply outside the
misappropriation context, and the Fourth Circuit’s tortured
analysis suggests that it ought not be. The court in Pirate
Investor failed to acknowledge that Zandford was a
misappropriation case, that Pirate Investor was not, and that
the applicability of a test may depend on context.
None of this is to say that the Fourth Circuit’s
considerations with respect to the first factor were without
merit. Facts indicating that a defendant benefitted from
misstatements or omissions certainly are relevant to
determining whether the defendant intended to influence an
investment decision.
The lesson from Pirate Investor’s
application of the first factor is that the Zandford test should
be limited to misappropriation cases and, outside the
misappropriation context, courts ought to use a more broadly
tailored factor such as whether the defendant benefited from
the misstatements or omissions.
B. Parties’ Relationship Such That It Necessarily Involves
Securities Trading
Pirate Investor cites Rowinski in support of its second
factor—“whether the parties’ relationship was such that it
In
would necessarily involve trading in securities.” 159
Rowinski, the Third Circuit considered whether State law
claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
violations of state consumer protection laws were preempted
under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
SLUSA, under certain conditions,
1998 160 (SLUSA). 161
preempts State law class actions with respect to fraud “in
connection with the purchase or sale of” securities. 162 In
159. Id. at 244.
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb(f) (2006).
161. Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 296 (3d Cir.
2005)).
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(1) (emphasis added). Congress enacted
SLUSA to curb State-law class action lawsuits with respect to nationally traded
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evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims in Rowinski, the Third
Circuit applied precedent with respect to the “in connection
with” requirement under Rule 10b-5. 163 Therefore, Rowinski
was a reasonable place for the Fourth Circuit to look in
creating its test.
The plaintiffs in Rowinski, retail brokerage customers of
Salomon Smith Barney (SSB), alleged that SSB had produced
investment research reports that reflected overly favorable
views of its investment banking clients in order to “reap
hundreds of millions of dollars of investment banking fees”
from those clients. 164 The plaintiffs accordingly sought to
recover, together with other damages, brokerage fees paid by
them to SSB. 165
Pirate Investor cites Rowinski in support of a single
factor, but the Third Circuit in fact employed its own
multifactor “flexible framework” to determine whether the
alleged misrepresentations met the “in connection with”
securities that began to arise after Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 and 78u-4; Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006). In the
PSLRA, Congress adopted a number of measures designed to curtail abuses in
federal antifraud class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities.
Id. at 81.
Among other things, PSLRA established stringent pleading
requirements, limited damages and attorney’s fees, allowed discovery to be
stayed until any motion to dismiss was resolved, and penalized those bringing
frivolous lawsuits. Id. 81–82. After PSLRA was enacted, plaintiffs started
bringing securities class actions under State law to avoid PSLRA’s restrictions.
Id. at 82. SLUSA was designed to stop the proliferation of these lawsuits by
providing for federal preemption of State law class actions brought on behalf of
over 50 people in which a plaintiff alleges “a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security” or
“that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.” 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (emphasis added). For purposes of SLUSA, a “covered
security” is “one traded nationally and listed on a regulated national exchange.”
Dabit, 547 U.S. at 83.
163. Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 299. Other courts have found that “ ‘in connection
with the purchase or sale’ of a security under SLUSA covers the same range of
activities that the SEC could prosecute as violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”
Instituto De Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir.
2008); Siepel v. Bank of Am., N.A., 526 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2008); see
Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85 (considering the meaning of “in connection with” in
SLUSA and indicating that “when ‘judicial interpretations have settled the
meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in
[a] new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its . . .
judicial interpretations as well.’ ”) (citation omitted).
164. Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 296–97.
165. Id. at 297.
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requirement. 166 The factors in the Third Circuit’s framework
included:
first, whether the . . . class action allege[d] a ‘fraudulent
scheme’ that ‘coincides’ with the purchase or sale of
securities; second, whether the complaint allege[d] a
material misrepresentation or omission ‘disseminated to
the public in a medium upon which a reasonable investor
would rely;’ [and] third, whether the nature of the parties’
relationship is such that it necessarily involves the
purchase or sale of securities . . . . 167

The court concluded that all three factors 168 supported
preemption of the plaintiffs’ claims under SLUSA. First, the
court found that securities transactions coincided with the
fraud as contemplated by Zandford because the transactions
were necessary to the success of the alleged fraud. 169 The
court reasoned that, without the purchases, the share prices
of SSB’s investment banking clients would not increase and,
without increases in share prices, the clients would not
benefit and “pay” SSB for that benefit by giving SSB
Second, without much
investment banking business. 170
discussion, the court determined that an investment research
report represented a “medium upon which a reasonable
Finally, and again with little
investor would rely.” 171
elaboration, the court found that the essential purpose of a
broker/investor relationship is to engage in securities
transactions. 172
The Third Circuit cited its prior decision in Angelastro v.
Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. to support its consideration
of and conclusion regarding the final factor—the factor that
Pirate Investor drew from Rowinski. 173 In Angelastro, the
Third Circuit considered whether a broker’s alleged
misrepresentations and nondisclosures with respect to the
166. Id. at 302.
167. Id. (citations omitted).
168. The court also considered “whether the prayer for relief ‘connect[ed]’ the
state law claims to the purchase or sale of securities.” Id. This factor is
relevant to whether a particular fraud is “in connection with” a securities
transaction for purposes of SLUSA, but does not make sense in the context of
Rule 10b-5.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 303.
173. Id. at 302–03.
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terms of a margin account met Rule 10b-5’s transactional
nexus requirement. 174 The plaintiff claimed that PrudentialBache Securities, Inc. had failed to disclose completely and
accurately its margin account terms, including the interest
rate to be charged and how interest charges would be
computed, 175 and that these misrepresentations and
omissions “induced her” to purchase securities on margin in
violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 176
In
considering
whether
Bache’s
alleged
misrepresentations and omissions were “in connection with” a
securities transaction, the Third Circuit noted that it
previously had interpreted the “touching” concept set out in
Bankers Trust as requiring a causal connection. 177 Such a
causal connection, the court observed, can exist in the context
of a course of dealing in securities and need not involve the
value of particular securities. 178 The court limited its holding,
however, noting the danger in adopting a rule under which
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that would encompass every loan
transaction that happened to involve securities. 179
Angelastro supports consideration of the context in which
a fraud occurs for purposes of the “in connection with”
requirement, but more significantly indicates how that
context should be considered. Importantly, the Third Circuit
in Angelastro was addressing a motion to dismiss and, based
on the context of the alleged fraud (i.e., a brokerage
relationship), only determined that it could not conclude, as a
matter of law, that a causal connection did not exist between
the alleged fraud and securities transactions. 180 The court did
174. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 941 (3d Cir.
1985).
175. Id. at 944.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 943.
178. Id. at 944; see also id. at 943 (noting that courts have determined that
churning claims are within the ambit of Rule 10b-5 and churning “does not
concern the merits of the individual securities bought and sold but rather the
excessiveness of the number of transactions in the aggregate.”).
179. See id. at 945 (“Our holding . . . does not mean that every loan
transaction in which a pledge of securities is involved or every bank loan for the
purpose of purchasing securities is necessarily within the purview of section
10(b).”).
180. Id. (“We therefore reject Bache’s assertion that, as a matter of law,
plaintiff could prove no set of facts to demonstrate a connection between the
credit terms of a margin account and her decision to purchase securities on
margin.”).
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not find that, because the relationship involved the trading of
securities, the fraud met the “in connection with”
requirement.
In fact, the court was very clear that
consideration of the context in which a fraud occurs should
not be taken too far:
We agree that there is a danger in construing the ‘in
connection with’ requirement so broadly that virtually any
type of misconduct related to a securities transaction even
in the most tenuous or tangential way might be claimed to
give rise to a federal securities law violation. . . . Our
holding that the misrepresentations alleged by Angelastro
regarding her margin account are cognizable under Rule
10b-5 does not mean that every loan transaction in which
a pledge of securities is involved or every bank loan for the
purpose of purchasing securities is necessarily within the
purview of section 10(b). 181

For Angelastro, then, context was significant only to the
extent that it evidenced a “causal connection between the
alleged misrepresentation and the harm incurred when a
security is purchased or sold.” 182
In Pirate Investor, the Fourth Circuit determined that
the relationships involved did not necessitate securities
transactions, and therefore the second factor of its test did not
weigh in favor of finding that the fraud was “in connection
with” a securities transaction. The defendants in Pirate
Investor were merely selling advice; the decision to purchase
securities entirely was in the hands of the recipients of the emails. 183 Accordingly, the court noted that the relationship
between Pirate and the recipients differed from the brokerage
relationship in Zandford, whose “very purpose . . . [was]
trading in securities.” 184
Significantly, the holding in Zandford was not based on
the context in which the fraud occurred. In fact, the Supreme
Court in Zandford was very clear that context itself is not
dispositive. The Court noted specifically that, “[i]f, for
example, a broker embezzles cash from a client’s account or
takes advantage of the fiduciary relationship to induce his
client into a fraudulent real estate transaction, then the fraud
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 944.
S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 247 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 247.
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would not include the requisite connection to a purchase or
sale of securities.” 185 This conduct the Court described is not
actionable under Rule 10b-5 notwithstanding the fact the
relationship between the broker and the client is one that
necessarily involves trading in securities.
The Fourth Circuit was right to include consideration of
the relationship between the applicable parties as a factor in
its test. As Angelastro suggests and Zandford confirms,
however, the parties’ relationship is relevant only to the
extent that it sheds light on the general principle governing
the “in connection with” requirement. Accordingly, Pirate
Investor’s second factor is important only to the extent that it
indicates whether the perpetrator of the fraud intended to
influence, or knew or was reckless in not knowing that his or
her actions could influence, an investment decision.
C. Defendant Induced Securities Transaction
Pirate Investor cites United International Holdings, Inc.
v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. 186 in support of its third factor—
“whether the defendant intended to induce a securities
transaction.” 187 In Wharf, United International Holdings, Inc.
(UIH) alleged that Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. had made
representations that induced UIH to purchase from Wharf an
option to purchase stock in a company that would operate a
cable television system in Hong Kong. 188
Wharf asserted that the alleged misrepresentations
related to Wharf’s intent to sell the stock subject to the option
and that such misrepresentations did not meet the “in
connection with” requirement under Rule 10b-5. 189 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed, citing precedent that found a valid Rule
10b-5 claim when a party agrees to sell a security while
holding a “secret reservation” not to do so. 190 According to the
185. S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 n.4 (2002).
186. United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207 (10th
Cir. 2000).
187. Pirate Investor, 580 F.3d at 244.
188. Wharf, 210 F.3d at 1214, 1221.
189. Id. at 1221.
190. Id. (citing In re Phillips Petroleum Secs. Litig., 881 F.3d 1236, 1245 n.13
(3d Cir. 1989); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986); Threadgill v.
Black, 730 F.2d. 810, 811–12 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451
F.2d 35, 40 (10th Cir. 1971); Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp. 12 F.3d 1170, 1176
(2d Cir. 1993)).
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court, “[i]t is a party’s secret reservation not to fully perform a
securities contract that distinguishes these cases from routine
breach of contract and common law fraud cases and brings
them within the scope of Rule 10b-5.” 191 The court observed
that “[Wharf’s] representations allegedly were made to induce
UIH to purchase the option” and found that, as a
consequence, “the misrepresentations were made to influence
UIH’s investment decision and were made in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security.” 192
The court in Pirate Investor determined that the
defendants intended to induce securities trades and therefore
the third factor in Pirate Investor’s test indicated that Pirate’s
misrepresentations were “in connection with” securities
transactions. 193 In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth
Circuit focused on two facts. First, the defendants benefitted
from securities purchases, and second, the special report,
which was provided after the investors paid $1000, repeated
claims about the mystery company’s major transaction and
the timing of its announcement and “called upon investors to
‘call your broker now and tell him to buy shares of [the
mystery company].’ ” 194
Just as it did with respect to its first factor, the Fourth
Circuit had to stretch to conclude that the defendants
intended to induce a securities transaction. The court didn’t
need to do so. In Wharf, the Tenth Circuit determined that, if
the defendant intended to induce a securities transaction, it
by definition met the applicable and broader principle that
the fraud was intended to influence an investment decision. 195
At bottom, the Fourth Circuit’s third factor is just a narrower
definition of an intent-based interpretation of the “in
connection with” requirement. With the broader principle
articulated in Part II.C., the court’s third factor is
unnecessary.
Again, the Fourth Circuit’s focus on the benefit to the
defendants is an important consideration.
With the
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 248 (4th Cir. 2009).
194. Id.
195. See Wharf, 210 F.3d at 1221 (“The representations allegedly were made
to induce UIH to purchase the option. As such, the misrepresentations were
made to influence UIH’s investment decision and were made in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security.”).
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modification proposed to the first factor of the Pirate Investor
test, benefit will be taken into account in determining
whether the perpetrator of the fraud intended to influence, or
knew or was reckless in not knowing that his or her actions
could influence, an investment decision.
Although Pirate Investor’s third factor is redundant when
coupled with the general principle from Part II.C, the court’s
analysis with respect to the factor suggests an additional
factor: “whether, through written or spoken words or other
conduct, the defendant encouraged a securities transaction.”
The language in Pirate’s special report urging investors to
call their brokers and ask them to purchase stock in the
mystery company certainly suggests that Pirate intended to
influence the recipients’ investment decisions. Considering
the presence or absence of similar language in other cases
will assist courts in gauging whether a defendant had the
requisite intent to satisfy Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus
requirement.
D. Misrepresentations Disseminated in a Medium Upon
Which a Reasonable Investor Would Rely
Pirate Investor looked to Semerenko v. Cendant Corp. to
support
its
final
factor—“whether
material
misrepresentations were ‘disseminated to the public in a
medium upon which a reasonable investor would rely.’ ” 196 In
Semerenko, the Third Circuit considered whether alleged
misrepresentations made by an acquiring company in a
tender offer were “in connection with” purchases and sales of
In 1998, Cendant Corp.
the target’s common stock. 197
commenced a tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of
common stock of American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc.
(ABI). 198 After two bids, Cendant entered into an agreement
to acquire ABI for a combination of cash and common stock. 199
Shortly after entering into the agreement, Cendant
disclosed possible accounting irregularities affecting its
earnings for the previous fiscal year and announced that an
196. Pirate Investor, 580 F.3d at 244 (quoting Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.,
223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (“public dissemination of information in a
medium upon which an investor would presumably rely”)).
197. Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 169.
198. Id. at 170.
199. Id.
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independent investigation of the problems was to be
conducted. 200 In a letter to Cendant’s shareholders following
the announcement, Cendant’s chairman and its chief
executive officer indicated that Cendant was committed to
The company later
completing the ABI acquisition. 201
announced that the effect on its prior year earnings would be
more than double its original estimate and that it had
detected additional irregularities affecting other fiscal
years. 202 Nevertheless, Cendant continued to make public
statements indicating that it remained committed to
acquiring ABI. 203 After the full effect of the irregularities was
disclosed, however, Cendant terminated its agreement to
acquire ABI. 204 In a class action lawsuit filed the day after
Cendant terminated the agreement, shareholders who
purchased ABI shares between the time Cendant made its
first tender offer bid and the time it terminated its agreement
with AGI claimed that Cendant, former officers and directors
of the company, and Ernst & Young, the company’s auditor,
had violated Rule 10b-5 by misrepresenting Cendant’s
financial condition and its commitment to acquiring ABI. 205
In considering whether the alleged misrepresentations
met Rule 10b-5’s transactional nexus requirement, the Third
Circuit acknowledged that, in Angelastro, it had required a
“causal connection between the claimed fraud and the
purchase or sale of a security.” 206 Bearing that in mind, the
court held that, when misrepresentations are publicly
disseminated into an efficient market, a plaintiff may meet
the “in connection with” requirement “simply by showing that
the misrepresentations in question were disseminated to the
public in a medium upon which a reasonable investor would
rely, and that they were material when disseminated.” 207
Moreover, the court explained that the standard can be met
even if the person making the misrepresentation did not
intend to influence an investment decision. 208 “Rather, [the
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 169, 171.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 176.
Id.
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plaintiff] must only show that the . . . misrepresentation[]
[was] reckless.” 209 As to an accountant’s liability, the Third
Circuit held that the plaintiff must make an additional
showing that the defendant knew or had reason to know that
the applicable financial statements and the related audit
reports would be used in a securities transaction. 210 The
court established these transactional nexus standards, but
stopped there, noting that it needed to remand the case
because the standards it articulated were different from the
standard the district court had applied. 211
The Third Circuit in Semerenko indicated that it was
adopting a standard like the one adopted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Ames and by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
McGann v. Ernst & Young with respect to publicly
disseminated information. 212 In In re Ames Department
Stores Inc. Stock Litigation, the Second Circuit considered
whether alleged misrepresentations made in offering
documents for an issuer’s debt offerings were “in connection
with” transactions in the issuer’s common stock for purposes
of Rule 10b-5. 213 Ames Department Stores, Inc. acquired a
division of Zayre Corporation in 1988. 214 Although Ames was
having difficulty integrating the Zayre division into the
company, Ames made statements in offering documents for
two debt offerings that indicated the integration was going
well. 215 In addition, the offering documents included positive
statements about Ames’s financial condition following the
acquisition. 216 Ames ultimately filed for bankruptcy. 217
209. Id.
210. Id. at 177.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 176.
213. See In re Ames Dep’t Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 961 (2d Cir.
1993) (noting that the district court had considered whether alleged
misrepresentations in prospectuses for reset notes and debentures could serve
as the basis for Rule 10b-5 liability with respect to stock purchases).
214. Id. at 955.
215. Id. at 958–60.
216. See id. at 958 (indicating that the 1989 annual report, which was
incorporated by reference in the reset note prospectus, predicted a 150%
increase in sales); see also id. at 959–60 (stating that the prospectus for the
debentures indicated that Ames had reduced overhead, “reassured investors
that anticipated strong sales . . . would enable Ames to meet its selling goals” in
the holiday season, and asserted that its revolving credit facility was sufficient
to meet its working capital and capital expenditure needs).
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Looking to the flexible standard cited in Bankers Life and
to its earlier decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, the
Second Circuit determined that misrepresentations made in
the offering documents for Ames’s debt securities could
operate as a fraud subject to Rule 10b-5 with respect to
transactions in Ames’s common stock. 218 The court noted
that, under Texas Gulf Sulphur’s test, to be “in connection
with” a securities transaction, a fraudulent device needed to
be of a type on which reasonable investors would rely and
which, in such reliance, would cause them to purchase or sell
Observing that Texas Gulf Sulphur’s “in
securities. 219
connection with” test was akin to its test for materiality, the
Second Circuit in Ames suggested that “any material
information issued by a corporation (whose securities are
publicly traded) has appropriate ‘connection’ to constitute a
10b-5 violation if the information is misleading.” 220 The court
noted, moreover, that the offering documents for Ames’s debt
securities were just the type of documents that a reasonable
investor would use to evaluate an investment in the
company’s common stock. 221
The court in Ames rejected the defendants’ argument
that Texas Gulf Sulphur required, for fraudulent statements
to be “in connection with” a securities transaction, that an
effect on investor decision-making be “not only reasonably
foreseeable, but also envisioned by the company.” 222 In so
doing, the Third Circuit noted that not only intentional
conduct, but also reckless conduct, is proscribed by Rule 10b5. 223
217. Id. at 961.
218. Id. at 964–65 (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971) and S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968); see id. at 961 (indicating that the district court had incorrectly “construed
the ‘in connection with’ requirement as requiring that the [mis]statements be
made in the registration statements for the particular stock at issue”). The
plaintiffs in Ames also alleged that misstatements had been made in various
publicly disseminated statements, such as press releases and periodic SEC
filings, but the district court only considered the documents associated with the
debt offerings. See id. at 968. The Second Circuit indicated that the alleged
misstatements in those publicly disseminated documents would support a Rule
10b-5 cause of action even if the debt offering documents did not. Id.
219. Id. at 965.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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In McGann v. Ernst & Young, the Ninth Circuit
considered whether an auditing firm that knew its audit
opinion would be included in a client’s Form 10-K could be
liable under Rule 10b-5 with respect to the opinion. 224 Ernst
& Young had issued an audit opinion with respect to the 1990
financial statements of Community Psychiatric Centers, and
the plaintiffs alleged that the opinion was fraudulent because
it did not disclose that the corporation had substantial
uncollectible accounts. 225
In evaluating whether the alleged fraud could meet the
“in connection with” requirement, the Ninth Circuit indicated
that it had adopted the standard set out in Texas Gulf
Sulphur that “false and misleading assertions are made ‘in
connection with’ securities trading ‘whenever [such]
assertions are made . . . in a manner reasonably calculated to
influence the investing public.’ ” 226 The court then determined
that an accountant that gives a fraudulent audit opinion,
knowing that it will be included in a Form 10-K, meets the
requirements of the Texas Gulf Sulphur standard. 227
According to the court, “[w]hile an outside accounting firm
might be blameless where it had no reason to know that its
client would use its audit report to sell securities, or where it
instructed its client not to release the report to the public,”
that was not the case for Ernst & Young. 228
With respect to its final factor, the Fourth Circuit in
Pirate Investor determined that the defendants distributed
their misrepresentations through a medium “on which a
In reaching this
reasonable investor would rely.” 229
conclusion, the court cited Texas Gulf Sulphur’s
determination that a misrepresentation is within the scope of
Rule 10b-5 when it is made “in a manner reasonably
calculated to influence the investing public.” 230 The court
noted that the Texas Gulf Sulphur standard had been refined
by several circuits such that, for the SEC to establish that a
misrepresentation is “in connection with” a securities
224. McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 391 (9th Cir. 1996).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 392–93.
227. Id. at 397.
228. Id.
229. S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 2009).
230. Id. at 249 (citing S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d
Cir. 1968)).
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transaction, the SEC must establish that “(1) the
misrepresentation[] . . . [was] disseminated to the public in a
medium upon which a reasonable investor would rely and (2)
[the misrepresentation was] material when disseminated.” 231
The court noted, however, that an e-mail is not a medium of
the same type as those considered sufficient by other courts
and that one typically would not expect a reasonable investor
The court nevertheless found
to rely on an e-mail. 232
compelling the fact that, because the defendants targeted
investors who subscribed to internet investment newsletters
and who therefore put faith in investment advice received on
the internet, the defendants “knew that they were directing
their misstatements to particular investors who did rely on
internet investment advice.” 233
Pirate Investor’s fourth factor is a longstanding test and
is very useful for measuring when a fraud satisfies the
general principle described in Part II.C. How a defendant
disseminates a misrepresentation certainly gives insight into
whether he or she intended to influence, or knew or was
reckless in not knowing that his or her actions could
influence, an investment decision. Courts should be careful,
however, not to apply the factor too narrowly. It is quite
possible, as in an e-mail of the type used in Pirate Investor,
that a perpetrator of a fraud could intend to influence an
investment decision even when it uses a means on which a
reasonable investor might not rely. Pirate Investor seems to
suggest that, if Pirate had distributed its e-mail more
broadly, the fourth factor might not weigh in favor of finding
the requisite transactional nexus for Rule 10b-5. This, it
seems, would be a mistake. If a person intended to influence
an investment decision, the fact that the means are unusual
should not alter the determination that the required
connection exists.

231. Id. (citing Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir.
2000)).
232. Id. at 250 (noting that other courts have applied the standard to
“research reports from a reputable broker; prospectuses; the sales and
marketing materials at brokerage houses and other points of sale; SEC filings;
and detailed drug advertisements published in sophisticated medical journals.”)
(citations omitted).
233. Id. at 251.
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CONCLUSION
In Ames, the Second Circuit observed that Bankers
Trust’s broad interpretation of the “in connection with”
requirement has obscured the analysis appropriate for
“straightforward” securities fraud cases, 234 and it warned that
cases at the fringes should not affect the analysis of ordinary
frauds, which affect market integrity. 235 The fraud at issue in
Pirate Investor certainly threatened market integrity, and the
Fourth Circuit’s indiscriminate application of its multifactor
framework bordered on the type of errant analysis warned
about by Ames.
The Fourth Circuit’s framework for analyzing Rule 10b-5
“in connection with” requirement nevertheless offers a good
start for approaching the requirement. When guided by a
general principle supported by Supreme Court precedent and
molded to be consistent the principle’s contours, Pirate
Investor’s multifactor test offers a methodical and workable
means for considering whether a fraud meets the
transactional nexus requirement.
Accordingly, courts should determine that a fraud is “in
connection with” the purchase or sale of a security for
purposes of Rule 10b-5 only when the perpetrator of the fraud
intended to influence, or knew or was reckless in not knowing
that his or her actions could influence, an investment
decision. In making this determination in a misappropriation
case, courts should consider—as the Supreme Court has
commanded—whether a securities transaction was necessary
to complete the fraud. With respect to other types of fraud,
however, courts should apply the following non-exclusive and
non-mandatory factors, which have been derived from Pirate
Investor and modified and supplemented as described above:
• whether the defendant benefited from the
misstatements or omissions;
• whether the parties’ relationship was such that it
would necessarily involve trading in securities;
• whether, through written or spoken words or
other conduct, the defendant encouraged a

234. See In re Ames Dep’t Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 966 (2d Cir.
1993) (stating that frauds involving face-to-face transactions are atypical and
“pose analytical difficulties not present in a straightforward case” like Ames).
235. Id.
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securities transaction; and
whether
material misrepresentations were
disseminated to the public in a medium upon
which a reasonable investor would rely.
Such an approach to Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with”
requirement is clear and logical. It might even satisfy Judge
Posner.
•

